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THE LEGITIMACY OF THE
CONTRACTING STATE
ANDREAS ABEGG*
I
INTRODUCTION: THE ORIENTATION OF
PRESENT-DAY DOCTRINE ON THE CONTRACTING STATE
Globalization challenges our understanding of the state as the main source
1
of legitimate law. This article will take this claim one step further. Today, we
may also see the decline of the state, in its modern sense, from within. Evidence
for this may be found in the rising importance of contracting by the
administrative state fulfilling its duties. For example, in various countries in
Europe, the administrative agencies make contracts with people regarding the
conditions they must meet to obtain asylum, parole, and social welfare
2
assistance. Furthermore, there are many types of contracts between
administrative agencies and private companies securing public services or
3
promoting public policies. For example, the federal administration of
Switzerland recently hired a private company to run the electronic cadastral
4
register, a task clearly once thought of as a core responsibility of the state.
In the law of continental Europe, the contract between the state and private
persons—also generally known as the administrative contract—appears in two
manifestations: as a private law contract between the administrative state and
private persons on the one hand, and as a public law contract between the
administrative state and private persons on the other. With this contract, either
in the private law or the public law manifestation, the state is using the tool of
legally stabilized cooperation to achieve its political goals. Thus, in the private
law administrative agreement, a public element is introduced with the setting of
a political goal, and in the administrative-law agreement, a traditional element
of the private is introduced with the cooperation form of contract.
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1. See Dan Wielsch, Relational Justice, 76 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 2, 2013 at 191.
2. Andreas Abegg, From the Social Contract to a Social Contract Law—Forms and Function of
Administrative Contracts in a Fragmented Society, 3 ANCILLA IURIS 1, 22 (2008) (Switz.). For more
examples, see Niels Åkerstrøm Andersen, The Contractualisation of the Citizen—On the
Transformation of Obligation into Freedom, 10 SOZIALE SYSTEME 273, 275–79 (2004) (Switz.).
3. See, e.g., Udo Di Fabio, Vertrag statt Gesetz? - Gesetzesvertretende und Gesetzesausfüllende
Verwaltungsverträge im Natur- und Landschaftsschutz, DEUTSCHES VERWALTUNGSBLATT [DVBL]
338 (1990) (Ger.); Jody Freeman, The Contracting State, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 155 (2000).
4. SCHWEIZERISCHES ZIVILGESETZBUCH [ZGB], CODE CIVIL [CC], CODICE CIVILE [CC]
[CIVIL CODE] Feb. 1, 1991, SR 210, art. 953 (Switz.); see also EGRIS—ELEKTRONISCHES
GRUNDSTÜCK-INFORMATIONSSYSTEM, http://www.egris.info (last visited July 7, 2012).
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From the observational perspective of a system theory based on evolutionary
theory, what is initially evident when we consider the subject of the contract
between the state and private persons is the juxtaposition of politics and law. In
this juxtaposition, on the one hand we have what the political system aims to
do—to unite the whole of society with the law and to bring about general
prosperity. On the other hand, the aim is for the administrative state to be
controlled by the rule of law: firstly, to ensure that planning security is a service
provided by the law for modern society (and in particular for the economy), and
secondly, to legitimize the administrative state’s use of force by presenting it as
a service provided by the law for the political system and for society in the
wider sense. Furthermore, the contract between the state and private persons
demonstrates a juxtaposition of law and those areas of society that, as a result of
the contract, become linked with the political system. Normally what we have
here would be a co-evolution between the political and the economic systems:
instead, the need to flexibly transfer certain state functions to the economic
sphere collides with the premise demanded by economics—that it should be
possible, within the market environment that has been safeguarded by the state,
to create a profit in economic projects, and to use this profit as a new basis for
future profit-making. To put it briefly, the flexibility required in the political
sphere for the implementation of public policies is set against the economic
5
sphere’s demands for planning security.
According to the current literature on contracts between the state and private
persons, the main task of legal scholars should be to “use” the legal institution
of the contract to make the increasingly divergent interest structures of society
useful to the administrative state, for the realization of the administrative state’s
6
own program. But, when the administrative state resorts to contracts and the
inevitable freedom of action and negotiation associated therewith, such increase
of cooperation results in a crisis of legitimacy for the administrative state, which
leaves the safe haven of traditional legitimacy mechanisms provided by
democracy and the rule of law. According to current literature, this crisis is to
7
be overcome by means of more extensive subjection to the law and subjection
8
to basic rights. These two postulates are to be realized with a substantive and
5. On this perspective, see Gunther Teubner, Vertragswelten: Das Recht in der Fragmentierung
von Private Governance Regimes, 17 RECHTSHISTORISCHES J. 234 (1998) (Ger.). On the relationship
between law and the administration, see generally PHILIPPE NONET, ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE:
ADVOCACY AND CHANGE IN A GOVERNMENT AGENCY (1969).
6. See, e.g., AUGUST MÄCHLER, VERTRAG UND VERWALTUNGSRECHTSPFLEGE:
AUSGEWÄHLTE FRAGEN ZUM VERTRAGLICHEN HANDELN DER VERWALTUNG UND ZUM EINSATZ
DES VERTRAGES IN DER VERWALTUNGSRECHTSPFLEGE 618 (2005) (Switz.); FRANK KLEIN, DIE
RECHTSFOLGEN DES FEHLERHAFTEN VERWALTUNGSRECHTLICHEN VERTRAGS 73 (2003) (Switz.).
7. See, e.g., MÄCHLER, supra note 6, at 385–86; ULRICH HÄFELIN, GEORG MÜLLER & FELIX
UHLMANN, ALLGEMEINES VERWALTUNGSRECHT N 1069–70 (2006) (Switz.); Eberhard SchmidtAßmann, Das Recht der Verwaltungsverträge zwischen gesetzlicher Bindung und administrativer
Gestaltung, in FESTSCHRIFT FÜR HEINRICH WILHELM KRUSE ZUM 70. GEBURTSTAG (Walter
Drenseck ed., 2001) (Ger.). Similarly for U.S. law, see Freeman, supra note 3, at 213.
8. See, e.g., Isabelle Häner, Grundrechtsgeltung bei der Wahrnehmung staatlicher Aufgaben durch
Private, 11 AKTUELLE JURISTISCHE PRAXIS 1144 (2002) (Switz.); Markus Schefer, Grundrechtliche
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procedural consolidation of norms based on the needs of the administrative
9
state. This present-day orientation of doctrine can find support in a long
tradition that has essentially sought to legitimize the new sovereign state with
10
an administrative law that is steeped in academic thinking.
The present-day crisis of legitimacy faced by the cooperating administrative
state, however, goes too deep for us to be able to address the problem solely
with the safeguards provided by public law as acquired in the struggle to defend
society against the new sovereign state, or by shifting the problems into the
11
sphere of private law, as has recently become fashionable. This article
discusses the legitimacy deficit of the administrative contract, including an
examination of the paths legal theory may offer to account for both the political
context requirements and the legitimacy requirements of the administrative
contract. This examination covers three legitimacy mechanisms: rule of law,
democratic, and evolutionary-reflexive theory.
II
THE NEED FOR NEW LEGITIMACY MECHANISMS FOR COOPERATIONS
BETWEEN THE STATE AND PRIVATE PERSONS
In the concept of the continental constitutional state, the legitimacy problem
is rendered invisible by a participation process that reaches out into society, and
is mitigated by the subjection of administrative agencies to the same law that
has come into being in this participation process. As history shows, however,
both the nature and intensity of the participation system and the nature and

Schutzpflichten und die Auslagerung Staatlicher Aufgaben, 11 AKTUELLE JURISTISCHE PRAXIS 1131
(2002) (Switz.).
9. Georg Müller, Zulässigkeit des Vertrages und zulässige Vertragsinhalte, in DER
VERWALTUNGSRECHTLICHE VERTRAG IN DER PRAXIS 36–37 (Isabelle Häner & Bernhard Waldmann
eds., 2007) (Switz.); Bernhard Waldmann, Der Verwaltungsrechtliche Vertrag – eine Einführung, in DER
VERWALTUNGSRECHTLICHE VERTRAG IN DER PRAXIS, supra, at 23. For a procedural point of view,
see MÄCHLER, supra note 6. For a German point of view, see Schmidt-Aßmann, supra note 7, at 67–68.
10. For a Swiss example of such academic thinking, see WALTHER BURCKHARDT, KOMMENTAR
DER SCHWEIZERISCHEN BUNDESVERFASSUNG VOM 29. MAI 1874 Art. 114 (1914); JAKOB DUBS, DAS
ÖFFENTLICHE RECHT DER SCHWEIZERISCHEN EIDGENOSSENSCHAFT DARGESTELLT FÜR DAS VOLK
14, 151, 206 (1878); ALFRED KÖLZ, NEUERE SCHWEIZERISCHE VERFASSUNGSGESCHICHTE: IHRE
GRUNDLINIEN IN BUND UND KANTONEN SEIT 1848 (2004); FERDINAND ZEHENDER, DR. JAKOB
DUBS, EIN SCHWEIZERISCHER REPUBLIKANER (1880). More skeptical was FRITZ FLEINER,
EIDGENÖSSISCHE VERWALTUNGSGERICHTSBARKEIT 13 (Neue Zürcher Zeitung 1921). For Germany,
see Otto Mayer, Zur Lehre vom öffentlichrechtlichen Vertrage, 3 ARCHIV FÜR ÖFFENTLICHES RECHT 3
(1888); for France, see RODOLPHE DARESTE, LA JUSTICE ADMINISTRATIVE EN FRANCE; OU TRAITE
DU CONTENTIEUX DE L’ADMINISTRATION (1862); EUGENE PERRIQUET, LES CONTRATS DE L’ETAT:
TRAITE COMPRENANT NOTAMMENT LES REGLES EN MATIERE DE VENTES . . . CONCESSIONS . . .
PENSIONS . . . RECOMPENSES NATIONALE (1884).
11. On the relationship between privatization and contractualization in the 1990s, see Stephan von
Bandemer et al., Staatsaufgaben—Von der “schleichenden Privatisierung” zum “aktivierenden Staat,” in
DEN STAAT NEU DENKEN. REFORMPERSPEKTIVEN FÜR DIE LANDESVERWALTUNGEN (Fritz Behrens
et al. eds., 1995) (Ger.); Gunther Teubner, Nach der Privatisierung? Diskurskonflikte im Privatrecht,
1998 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR RECHTSSOZIOLOGIE 19 (Ger.); Gunther Teubner, After Privatization? The
Many Autonomies of Private Law, 51 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 393 (1998) (Eng.).
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intensity of the legal subjection remain contingent. The possibility of
consultation with those who are subject and the subjection under the law of
those who wield power means that the threat of the application of force (which
must always lurk behind the law) is made bearable. On the other hand the
appearance of the unavailable is generated—that is, the law as established by
means of instruments no longer appears as such, but on the contrary appears to
be withdrawn from the direct legislator and generated by society, which subjects
13
itself to the same law. From a historico-evolutionary perspective, the
underlying unity of politics and law in the modern national state has served to
overcome the previously unsatisfactory enforcement of the law, as well as the
difficulty of controlling a complex society. This sentiment was expressed
particularly powerfully in the French Revolution, and in particular with the
separation of the administrative state and the jurisdiction of the ordinary
14
courts; it is also evident in the theories of Johann Heinrich Gottlob von Justi
15
(1720–1771). Once politics and law were placed on an equal footing, it became
possible for the political sphere, for better implementation and stabilization
over time, to clothe its communications in the form of the law whenever
required, above all in the process of legislation and in the issuing of
administrative dispositions, which were modelled on court judgements.
Admittedly, with the positivization of the law, the persuasive power of politics
(now cast into the legal mold) and the persuasive power of the law as supported
with the state monopoly on power, were massively dependent upon legitimacy
provided by law. In the early days of the modern state, this legitimacy was in
accordance with the hierarchically conceived state that is responsible for
ensuring the unity of society—sought in the sovereign. Consultation in political
matters, through non-political rationalities such as independent courts or
cooperations with private persons, was precisely what was to be overcome, a
16
relict of the feudal state.
In this situation it is clear that the contract on the one hand and legitimacy
through legislation on the other hand are incompatible in the sense that the
12. For more details, see ANDREAS ABEGG, DIE EVOLUTION DES VERWALTUNGSVERTRAGS
ZWISCHEN STAATSVERWALTUNG UND PRIVATEN 216, 280, 333 (2010) (Switz.). For the foundations of
this view, see MAX WEBER, WIRTSCHAFT UND GESELLSCHAFT 125 (Tübingen J.C.B. Mohr Verlag
1980) (1922) (Ger.).
13. JÜRGEN HABERMAS, FAKTIZITÄT UND GELTUNG: BEITRÄGE ZUR DISKURSTHEORIE DES
RECHTS UND DES DEMOKRATISCHEN RECHTSSTAATS (1992) (Ger.). On administrative law, see
Schmidt-Aßmann, supra note 7, at 65–67.
14. ROLAND MOUSNIER, LA VENALITE DES OFFICES SOUS HENRI IV ET LOUIS XIII 325–26
(1945); see also ROLAND MOUSNIER, LES INSTITUTIONS DE LA FRANCE SOUS LA MONARCHIE
ABSOLUE 1598–1789 (1974) (Fr.); ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, L' ANCIEN REGIME ET LA REVOLUTION
191–92, 202 (1856) (Fr.). For more details, see ABEGG, supra note 12, at 32–36.
15. JOHANN HEINRICH GOTTLOB VON JUSTI, DIE GRUNDFESTE ZU DER MACHT UND
GLÜCKSEELIGKEIT DER STAATEN, ODER, AUSFÜHRLICHE VORSTELLUNG DER GESAMTEN POLICEYWISSENSCHAFT 464–65 (1760) (Ger.); JOHANN HEINRICH GOTTLOB VON JUSTI, GRUNDSÄTZE DER
POLIZEIWISSENSCHAFT 615–17 (1782) (Ger.).
16. See NIKLAS LUHMANN, DAS RECHT DER GESELLSCHAFT 414–45 (1993) (Ger.). On the
historical events bearing withness of transition see ABEGG, supra note 12, at 33–35.
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contractual connection between the political and economic spheres actually
threatens to dissolve the legitimacy mechanism of the sovereign, and
subsequently that of the democratic constitutional state, which assumes
sovereignty from the monarchical ruler. If the administrative state wishes to
intervene in areas of society by means of cooperation, then the sovereignty of
the state (that is, its claim to bring about unity and prosperity in society
precisely by the fact that all power is monopolized in the state) is called into
question. Admittedly, it was possible for this problem to be mitigated in the
constitutional state, so that (1) subjection to the sovereign was consistently
transferred to subjection to the legislation, and (2) this subjection to the
legislation—precisely through its open textual structure—was made less
stringent when administrative courts were able to preside over a more broadly
17
interpreted subjection to the legislation. This would not remove, however, a
fundamental incompatibility between cooperations involving the state and
private persons on the one hand, and the legitimacy models of the modern state
on the other hand: if the administrative state wishes to cooperate with private
persons in order to fulfill its functions, or if it is obliged to do so, then it must to
a certain extent also have the corresponding freedom to negotiate the ends and
means of such cooperations. Here, the administrative state is at least potentially
determining not only the path to the political goal, but is also increasingly
determining the goal itself, with the result that the concept of “legality of the
administrative state,” as the guarantor of social organization under the rule of
law, and as the mediator of democratic legitimacy in the form of a sophisticated
18
participation process, is called into question.
In light of the self-radicalizing dynamic of contracts between the state and
private persons, and their function of case-by-case bringing together a society
that is drifting apart, the concept of subjection to statutory law cannot on its
own create sufficient legitimacy; therefore it is interesting to look for possible
ways to take account of the requirements of the political context, and in
particular, to ensure legitimacy.
III
RULE-OF-LAW LEGITIMACY MECHANISMS
Advocates of rule-of-law legitimacy mechanisms are often positively
disposed towards the self-regulation of society and not generally opposed to
cooperation between the state and private persons. They are critical, however,
of the blurring of the outlines of the concept of administrative law, stating that
17. See, e.g., ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DE LA DEMOCRATIE EN AMERIQUE 101 (1835–1840)
(Fr.) (discussing the evolution of the Conseil d’Etat, focusing more on the control of the administration
within the state hierarchy than on the rights of the citizens). See also Jean-Marie Auby, The Abuse of
Power in French Administrative Law, 18 AM. J. COMP. L. 549, 549–50 (1970). On the evolution of the
doctrine of excès de pouvoir, see FRANÇOIS BURDEAU, HISTOIRE DU DROIT ADMINISTRATIF: DE LA
RÉVOLUTION AU DÉBUT DES ANNEES 1970, 83, 167–74 (1995) (Fr.); Barna Horvath, Rights of Man:
Due Process of Law and Excès de Pouvoir, 4 AM. J. COMP. L. 539 (1955).
18. Schmidt-Aßmann, supra note 7, at 65–66.
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the creation of self-regulatives and cooperations relieves the administrative
state of its burdens, to the point of becoming a substitute for it, transferring
19
responsibility for fulfillment of public purposes to private persons.
Consequently, advocates of rule-of-law legitimacy propose that the concept of
administrative enforcement should be extended and that hybrid organizational
structures should be reincorporated into administrative law as a new
20
administrative reality, whereby the traditional transfer of legitimacy would be
restored through the functional synthesis of public law and politics under the
21
continental form of rule of law, the “Rechtsstaat.”
In this view, basic rights ought to apply if any form of private order becomes
22
existentially dependent upon politics. In addition, the responsibility of the
state as a guarantor vis-à-vis affected third parties ought not to lapse. As soon
as the state brings public purposes into the sphere of self-regulation by using
financial allocations or framework conditions, corresponding subjective rights
are directed against the state, placing the state under an obligation to exert an
23
influence on self-regulatives or on contracts.
But these proposals are based on a state-centered view of society, as if the
state, or the political system, were still able to consider and decide how the
whole of society is to be constituted, and as if the state could still be identified
as such in every case. In fact, the political system has largely lost this ability in
our polycontextural society, that is, a society producing a multitude of
autonomous programs and semantics. The political system knows as little as the
law does about the autonomies of other social subsystems, to say nothing of the
way these subsystems react to agitation arising from their environment; neither
does the political system have the resources to hold these diverse social
24
subsystems together in one unit by its own power. And it is precisely for this
reason that today the political system is no longer able to fulfill the great Social
Contract by which the state is supposed to centralize all power and thereby
bring about security and prosperity for all. So this great Social Contract is split
up into a multitude of small contracts between the political system, which has
not given up its claims, and society, which in spite of being split up in a
multitude of autonomous programs and semantics is still dependent upon the
services provided by the political system.

19. Udo Di Fabio, Verwaltung und Verwaltungsrecht zwischen gesellschaftlicher Selbstregulierung
und staatlicher Steuerung, in KONTROLLE DER AUSWÄRTIGEN GEWALT: VERÖFFENTLICHUNGEN DER
VEREINIGUNG DER DEUTSCHEN STAATSRECHTSLEHRER 237, 240–42 (1997) (Ger.).
20. Id. at 241–42, 252. Similarly, proposing the expansion of administrative law to reincorporate
the new emerging structure for the United States, see Kenneth A. Bamberger, Regulation as
Delegation: Private Firms, Decisionmaking, and Accountability in the Administrative State, 56 DUKE L.J.
377 (2006).
21. Di Fabio, supra note 19, at 251.
22. Id. at 256–67.
23. Id. at 262–71, especially at 270–71.
24. On this perspective, see WEBER, supra note 12, at 599–600.

09_ABEGG_BP (DO NOT DELETE)

No. 2 2013]

8/5/2013 12:37 AM

THE LEGITIMACY OF THE CONTRACTING STATE

145

Theories like the supervision state, according to which the political system is
no longer the sole producer of the collective assets of society but still retains a
25
kind of overall supremacy over the production of these assets, lead us in the
right direction but fail to recognize the sheer radicality of the emerging
contracting state: because of the general lack of means to harmonize the
autonomous programs and semantics that have developed within our
fragmented society, unity cannot (or cannot any longer) be achieved by power
(or by religion either), but only tentatively, as an isolated and momentary unity
of a fragmented society.
Consequently the strategy of expanding public law and thus the political
bias of the administrative contract to include cooperations between the state
and private persons would be shown to be a move in the wrong direction.
Therefore, in addition to a modified concept of basic liberties
(“Grundrechte”) applied to public law contracts, which I will not further specify
at this time, I will look at what democratic legitimacy mechanisms have to offer.
IV
DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY MECHANISMS
Jürgen Habermas, a German sociologist and a philosopher in the tradition
of critical theory, has strongly influenced the recent discussion on democratic
legitimacy mechanisms. Habermas essentially understands the democratic
constitutional state as the institutionalization of processes and communication
preconditions for discursive formation of opinion and will; these processes and
preconditions make legitimate lawmaking possible. Because this
institutionalization operates through the law, private autonomy is secured. And
as a result of institutionalized opinion and will formation working together with
informal public communication, societal integration (solidarity) is achieved.
However (according to Habermas), the central problem of the cooperating
administrative state is the increased detachment of instrumentalized law from
legitimized non-disposable law, because by using the form of contract the
26
administrative state evades its statutory basis as passed by the legislator.
Consequently there can be no return to the old concept of the constitutional
state, for with the reflexive discourse with alternative forms of action and legal
forms, general abstract legislation can no longer be a central component of the
27
obligation and legitimacy effect of the constitutional state. Thus, a new form of

25. HELMUT WILLKE, IRONIE DES STAATES:
POLYZENTRISCHER GESELLSCHAFT 335–36 (1992) (Ger.).

GRUNDLINIEN EINER STAATSTHEORIE

26. HABERMAS, supra note 13.
27. This argument presupposes the continental tradition of concealing the differences between law
and statute. See Thomas Vesting, Rechtswissenschaftliche Beobachtung des Rechtssystems:
Einheitsbildung und Differenzerzeugung, in ALLGEMEINES VERWALTUNGSRECHT—ZUR
TRAGFÄHIGKEIT EINES KONZEPTS (Hains-Heinrich Trute et al. eds., 2008) (Ger.).
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constitutionality has to be sought—one that governs the disposability of
28
legitimacy grounds and the nature of the way they are handled.
Today, according to Habermas, it is the citizen of the state that is supposed
to enter into the legitimization process—in place of the independent market
participant in a liberal constitutional state or the client in a social welfare
administration. It is for the citizen to take part in political discourses in which
the preconditions necessary for equal freedom—and thus the criteria for equal
and unequal treatment—are formed. Consequently, administrative actions
requiring legitimacy would have to be supplemented by justification discourses,
in which it would admittedly not be possible for the formation of opinion and
will to operate through the normal processes of legislation, but would acquire
legitimacy by other means—for example through justification before a public
justice criticism forum, which would consist of more than just legal experts and
which could make problematic decisions of principle a subject of public debate.
Specifically, this relates to legitimacy in the context of the weighing of collective
assets, legitimacy in the context of the choice between competing means and
goals, and normative assessment of individual cases, which existing general
29
abstract statutory regulations have not allowed.
This new kind of administrative action, separated from the traditional
democratic constitutional state, can (according to Habermas) acquire legitimacy
in other ways. But it can do so solely because the administrative action makes
good the present absence of normative grounds with an inner democratization
(or, it could also be said, a democratization that is expanded to incorporate
society). Depending on the sphere in question, this expanded democratization
can (in addition to the protection provided by law) arise from administrative
participation, that is, the internal institutionalization of ombudsman forums,
procedures similar to court procedures, hearings and publications, participation
in decisions by affected parties or their representatives, and so on.
Consequently, the reduction of legal protection is also to be dealt with, for
example, by the extension of the reservation of statutory powers and of the
concept of intervention, the extension and reconfiguration of the protection of
basic liberties (“Grundrechte”), and the expansion of collective legal protection
forms. As in the concept of the welfare state, it is important that the individual,
or the person to whom the administrative action is addressed, must be placed in
such a position that he is able to expand and safeguard his interests and ensure
30
that they are taken into account in decision-making processes.
However, caution is necessary, for the polycontextural nature of modern
society must be taken into account. The question whether (as Teubner would
31
say) the differentiation of society already contains a normative principle, or
28. HABERMAS, supra note 13, at 527–29.
29. Id. at 90–106, especially at 105, 527–37.
30. Id. at 527–31; see also DIETER GRIMM, DIE ZUKUNFT DER VERFASSUNG 414 (1991) (Ger.).
31. Gunther Teubner, Ein Fall von struktureller Korruption? Die Familienbürgschaft in der
Kollision unverträglicher Handlungslogiken (BVerfGE 89, 214 ff.), 81 KRITISCHE
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whether the observer has to take this differentiation as a basis for his model of
32
society in order to gain an adequate picture on which to base his conclusions,
need not detain us here. For simply because the polycontextural society is
recognized as a society under the law, the dangers of a one-sided regulation of
society by the political sphere, such as those that threaten to arise in the context
of the implementation of Habermas’s proposals, are recognized. In this sense,
therefore, any direct intervention in the complex structures that have evolved in
unfamiliar subsystems have to be viewed with caution. In particular, the
findings of the interventionist state, developed over a lengthy period of time,
would have to give rise to reservations: self-organized discourses such as those
of economics do not allow targeted control through political processes in such a
33
way as to give rise to the politically envisaged effects in all cases. On the
contrary, in the process of translation from one system to another, these
political programs acquire a life of their own and can easily produce the
34
opposite result of what was intended.
Still, we must confirm Habermas’s finding that numerous forms of
cooperation between the state and private persons do not fulfill the
requirements of the political system regarding legitimate regulation: for
example, in administrative contracts, the economic system may link up with
politics, but within the specific cooperation (insofar as it is subject to private
law) it does not accomplish the re-entry of the political, or does so only in an
unsatisfactory manner. How, then, can the requirements of legitimate law be
supported, without our falling into the trap of interventionist illusions?
V
EVOLUTIONARY-REFLEXIVE LEGITIMACY
The difficult question, in the language of evolutionary theory, is how the
different social systems, supported by law, can in the context of cooperations be
made to take account of the differentiation of their environmental systems and
their principal requirements to reach a point of equilibrium. Or to put it in more
concrete terms: How can the political system, on the one hand, be made to
respect the self-organization of non-political discourses (as a re-entry of such a
self-organization, for example that of economics into politics)—in spite of
constantly changing political programs that have to be implemented, and in
spite of the continuing responsibility to guarantee unity in society? And how, on
VIERTELJAHRESSCHRIFT FÜR GESETZGEBUNG UND RECHTSWISSENSCHAFT [KRITV] 388 (2000)
(Ger.); see also Di Fabio, supra note 19, at 262.
32. MARC AMSTUTZ, ANDREAS ABEGG & VAIOS KARAVAS, SOZIALES VERTRAGSRECHT
(2006) (Switz.).
33. See Gunther Teubner, Das regulatorische Trilemma: Zur Diskussion um post-instrumentale
Rechtsmodelle, 13 QUADERNI FIORENTINI PER LA STORIA DEL PENSIERO GIURIDICO MODERNO 109
(1984) (It.).
34. See, e.g., Peter Oestmann, Gesetzgeberische Eingriffe in die Privatautonomie und ihre Folgen:
Das Beispiel der Sicherungsrechte im Mietvertrag, 86 KRITV 96 (2003) (Ger.) (discussing German
tenancy law).
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the other hand, can the self-organized non-political discourses, such as in
particular the economic system, be made to consider the political requirements
and in particular the need for politics to have legitimacy in terms of the use of
political power (as a re-entry of politics into the rationality of self-organized
systems)—particularly if, in the context of cooperation between the state and
private persons, the traditional path of legislation, as Habermas himself points
35
out, no longer leads to the desired goal and, at the same time, the law in a
polycontextural society has neither the knowledge nor the opportunity to
implant specific and effective regulations in the discourses involved in the
contract?
A procedural approach can assist us in our uncertainty concerning the
correct law—for example, Wiethölter’s approach, which (like Habermas’s)
promises always and repeatedly to bring about the integration of the society of
the law through the participation of society in the “just-i-fication” (“RechtFertigung”) of the law, and thereby simultaneously brings about a new kind of
36
legitimacy.
If the task of producing (in the process of cooperations between the state
and private persons) norms that are adequate for society and at the same time
legitimate can no longer be solely delegated to the economic sphere (by means
of private autonomy) or to the political sphere (by means of legislation), then
the weight of the legitimacy mechanisms—as I have shown in my historical
37
studies of the contracting state—is shifted to the courts.
If—jumping now to a timid normative claim derived from the democratic
legitimacy mechanisms—it is important to promote the possibilities available to
the parties to the contract, for engaging with each other and for giving
consideration to the respective requirements, then we must not only turn our
attention to the structural links (such as the contract) that make it possible for
the parties to perceive themselves as—in the language of systems theory—the
environment of the other systems, but also focus on the structures in which each
party embedded in its own discourse reacts to requirements arising from its
environment.
In terms of doctrine, it is interesting to observe that decisions dealing with
the contracting state often make use of regime collision rules. Such rules are
normally worded in an open manner, so that the evolutionary dimension of the
co-existence of regimes can be covered. Traditionally, such conflict of laws rules
in the law of property have been designed with the compatibility of the
economic sphere and the security of human existence in mind. But, in their
layout they are formulated in a sufficiently open manner to be able to take on
this compatibilization function in a very general sense. An example from Swiss
35. HABERMAS, supra note 13, at 527–37.
36. Rudolf Wiethölter, Materialization and Proceduralization in Modern Law, in DILEMMAS OF
LAW IN THE WELFARE STATE (Gunther Teubner ed., 1982).
37. ABEGG, supra note 12; Andreas Abegg, The Evolution of the Contracting State and its Courts,
59 AM. J. COMP. L. 611 (2011).
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law is the general group of clauses relating to good morals, personality rights,
40
and good faith.
It is interesting to observe the courts’ reasoning in cases involving a contract
between the state and private persons concerning an issue that has not been
foreseen by the legislator. The courts often observe that the aim of the contract
corresponds to a reasonable and common set of values and that the rules chosen
to achieve the aims of the contract were necessary in light of these values. This
type of reasoning corresponds to Article 28 of the Civil Code, which gives a
person infringing another person’s personality rights the possibility to justify his
behavior.
In the eyes of systems theory, precisely through the broad structure of such
a collision rule, the intention is for a complex process of “social” legislation to
be initiated in the interplay of law, academic discipline, and the systems
involved in the conflict. In such “social” legislation the systems involved are
urged to generate new variations, directed by the considerations of the courts
and the need to justify deficits of legitimacy with regard to the interest involved.
These new variations are then examined by academics to ensure that they are
consistent with the current system of law. If necessary, the new variations are
again presented to the courts for selection, and may be rejected again—a
process that continues until a selection capable of providing stabilization has
been found. In short, the conflict has to be referred back to the systems
concerned—by all means with an indication of the solution to be sought and the
corresponding conditions with regard to options.
This is where this evolutionary-procedural theory meets the deliberative
theory, according to which the courts assist private players to envisage
normative goals, as the result of successful learning processes, without setting
aside the principle of self-restriction. For private players are themselves called
upon to find such normative goals by means of experimental forms of selforganization. In this model, the deliberative theory sees opportunities for a
41
transnational democracy at the global level, realized through private law. Yet
38. OBLIGATIONENRECHT, CODE DES OBLIGATIONS, CODICE DELLE OBBLIGAZIONI [CODE OF
OBLIGATIONS] Jan. 1, 1912, SR 220, art. 19–20 (Switz.).
39. SCHWEIZERISCHES ZIVILGESETZBUCH [ZGB], CODE CIVIL [CC], CODICE CIVILE [CC]
[CIVIL CODE] Dec. 10, 1907, SR 210, art. 27–28 (Switz.).
40. SCHWEIZERISCHES ZIVILGESETZBUCH [ZGB], CODE CIVIL [CC], CODICE CIVILE [CC]
[CIVIL CODE] Dec. 10, 1907, SR 210, art. 2–3 (Switz.); See the corresponding comments in Peter Gauch,
Der Schätzer und die Dritten, in NORM UND WIRKUNG: FESTSCHRIFT FÜR WOLFGANG WIEGAND
ZUM 65. GEBURTSTAG (Wolfgang Weigand et al eds., 2005) (Switz.).
41. Oliver Gerstenberg, Privatrecht, Verfassung und die Grenzen judizieller Sozialregulierung, in
ULFRID NEUMANN AND LORENZ SCHULTZ, VERANTWORTUNG IN RECHT UND MORAL—ARCHIV
FÜR RECHTS- UND SOZIALPHILOSOPHIE [ARSP]—BEIHEFT 74 (2000) (Ger.); Oliver Gerstenberg,
“Radikale Rechtsfortbildung” im (Europäischen) Vertrags - und Haftungsrecht: Ein Beitrag zur
Methodendiskussion, in RECHTSVERFASSUNGSRECHT: RECHT–FERTIGUNG ZWISCHEN PRIVATRECHTSDOGMATIK UND GESELLSCHAFTSTHEORIE (Christian Joerges & Gunther Teubner eds., 2003)
(Ger.); Oliver Gerstenberg, Law’s Polyarchy: A Comment on Cohen and Sabel, 3 EUR. L. J. 343 (1997)
(U.K.); Jürgen Neyer & Christian Joerges, From Intergovernmental Bargaining to Deliberative Political
Processes: The Constitutionalization of Comitology, 3 EUR. L. J. 273 (1997) (U.K.).
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it remains grounded in particular in the old danger of (primarily political)
power, and consequently, on its basis of the theory of action, it cannot fully take
account of the numerous differentiated rationalities of society and the
correspondingly different dangers faced by social sectors.
With a simple “no, that is not right” and relatively vague requirements in
terms of dogma as envisaged in the normative requirements specified above,
therefore, a process is to be set in motion whereby, in a procedural manner,
empirically supported solutions are sought that obey the strict normative
requirements of the law and at the same time are recognized in those
rationalities that have brought the conflict before the law. In particular,
following a court decision it is principally for legal scholars and law
practitioners to find variations on the doctrine.

